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1ABSTRACT
The regulation oﬀ-label drugs is a complicated and controversial area of the law. Regulators must
protect patients’ safety without interfering with physicians’ practice of medicine or manufacturers’ First
Amendment rights. The recent Neurontin decisions, which apply the doctrine of false claims to prescription
drug regulation, only adds additional complexity. This paper explores the federal government’s attempts
to regulate the promotion of oﬀ-label drugs. It discussed the advantages and disadvantages of oﬀ-label
marketing, the current regulatory environment, and the implications of the Neurontin lawsuit.
I. Introduction
On October 2, 2003, Philadelphia Assistant U.S. Attorney Virginia Gibson delivered a speech to the Phar-
maceutical Compliance Forum noting the importance of the recent “Neurontin” decisions and signaling the
government’s new willingness to use the False Claims Act to restrict or even eliminate a manufacturer’s
ability to promote the oﬀ-label uses of its product.1 This is not the ﬁrst time the appropriateness and the
legality of oﬀ-label drug promotion have been debated. Indeed, this gray area of the law, where a physi-
cian’s duty to practice medicine to the best of his ability collides with the government’s responsibility to
monitor the nation’s drug supply, has long perplexed policy makers, academic scholars, practitioners, and
the regulated industry.
Oﬀ-label drug use refers to the very common practice of using a drug in a manner or for a reason not
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). An oﬀ-label drug is not necessarily dangerous.
In fact, for many diseases, it is the best or even the only course of treatment available. Pharmaceutical
manufacturers, however, with certain minor exceptions, are not permitted to encourage oﬀ-label use of their
product. Although this area of law has developed considerably over the last decade, several important issues
1Neurontin Ruling is Guide for DOJ Oﬀ-Label Promotion Cases - Prosecutor, F-D-C REP. (“The Pink Sheet”), Oct. 13,
2003, at 15, 15 [hereinafter Pink Sheet].
2remain unsettled. Are restrictions on oﬀ-label promotion good policy? Does government regulation promote
patient safety or simply interfere with the legitimate practice of medicine? Are current laws constitutional?
Adding to the confusion is the Neurontin case, which continues to be litigated in Massachusetts District
Court and oﬀers a novel theory for challenging the legality of oﬀ-label promotion. If successful, this case will
dramatically alter the pharmaceutical industry’s marketing practices and will provide the government with
a new tool for its enforcement arsenal.
This paper discusses the government’s historically muddled policy toward oﬀ-label drug promotion and
current eﬀorts to change that policy. Reluctant to interfere with a doctor’s professional judgment, yet wary
of drugs that have not been adequately tested for safety and eﬀectiveness, Congress has long sent mixed
signals regarding the legality of oﬀ-label drugs. The courts, in turn, have responded with decisions that mimic
Congress’ confused policy – some cases embrace the goal of protecting patients from oﬀ-label marketing while
other cases dramatically curtail the FDA’s authority. Although recent legislation has helped clarify which
promotional practices are legal, the policy remains internally conﬂicted and the law remains susceptible to a
constitutional challenge. Moreover, as seen in the Neurontin case, proponents of regulation have found new
ways of using old laws to challenge pharmaceutical manufacturers’ practices.
II. Deﬁnition
An “oﬀ-label drugs” is simply a drug used for a condition or in a manner not appearing on the FDA
approved label.2 Indeed, almost every consumer is familiar with oﬀ-label medicines. The American Medical
2James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Oﬀ-Label Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and Miscon-
ceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71, 71 n.2, (1998). A recent FDA presentation deﬁned oﬀ-label drugs as medicines
“use[d] for indication[s], dosage form[s], population[s] or other use parameter[s] not mentioned in the approved labeling.”
Janet Woodcock, Lecture to Drug Information Association, A Shift in the Regulatory Approach, (June 23, 1997), at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/present/diamontreal/regappr/sld001.htm.
3Association reported in 1995 that approximately half of all prescriptions were written for oﬀ-label uses.3
Moreover, the General Accounting Oﬃce (GAO) has testiﬁed that 90 percent of cancer drug use, 80 percent
of pediatric use, and 80-90 percent of drugs used to treat rare diseases are prescribed oﬀ-label.4 Perhaps
the best known example is aspirin. For years, physicians prescribed aspirin to reduce the risk of heart
attacks.5 However, the FDA did not approve such usage until 1998.6 A less celebrated example is Fen-
Phen.7 Both fenﬂuramine (“Fen”) and phentermine (“Phen”) were approved by the FDA for weight loss.8
However, doctors ignored fenﬂuramine’s labeling by having some patients use the medicine for more than a
year when it was only labeled for duration of a “few weeks,” and by combining the two drugs even though
neither label discussed using the drugs in tandem.9 Many patients suﬀered heart valve damage as a result.10
Most recently,11 OxyContin, a powerful medication approved for moderate to severe chronic pain, generated
considerable controversy, when it was prescribed for all types of discomfort.12 Oﬀ-label drugs, therefore,
come in a variety of forms. While some instances are widely accepted, and doctors could be accused of
malpractice if they did not prescribe the drug,13 others are dangerous and are not an appropriate part of
medical care.
3Veronica Henry, Oﬀ-Label Prescribing: Legal Implications, 20 J. LEGAL MED., 365, 365 (1999).
4Final Report on the Activities of the House Comm. on Government and Oversight, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. 104 H. REP.
874 (Section 2), (January 2, 1997) at 114.
5Jim Oliphant, FDA’s New Drug War Industry Fights For Alternative Uses of Approved Products, LEGAL TIMES, January
10, 2000 at 1.
6Id.
7See In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenﬂuramine, Dexfenﬂuramine), No. 99-20593, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12275 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 28, 2000); Elliot v. A.H. Robins Co. (In re N.Y. County Diet Drug Litig.), 691 N.Y.S.2d 501 (App. Div. 1999).
8Paul D. Rheingold & David B. Rheingold, Oﬀense or Defense? Managing the Oﬀ-Label Use Claim, TRIAL, Mar. 2001,
at 52.
9Id.
10James O’Reilly and Amy Dalal, Oﬀ-Label or Out of Bounds? Prescriber and Marketer Liability for Unapproved Uses of
FDA-Approved Drugs, 12 ANN. HEALTH L. 295, 300 (2003).
11While Aspirin, Fen-Phen and Oxy-Contin are the examples cites most often in contemporary literature, older examples of
oﬀ-label drugs include Retin-A, silicone, and collagen injections. Steven R. Salbu, Oﬀ-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing
of FDA-Approved Drugs: An Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. REV. 181, 202 n.130 (citing Michael
Unger, More Bite Urged for Watchdog FDA, NEWSDAY, Nov. 24, 1992 at 29).
12See Note, Mark A. Ford, Another Use of OxyContin: The Case for Enhancing Liability for Oﬀ-Label Drug Marketing, 83
B.U. L. REV. 429 (2003).
13Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. &
MED. 361, 399 (2002).
4Indeed, Professor Salbu has identiﬁed three kinds of oﬀ-label activities – oﬀ-label use, oﬀ-label prescription,
and oﬀ-label marketing.14 Oﬀ-label use occurs when a consumer uses a drug in a manner inconsistent with its
label.15 Frequently, this entails changing the dosage amount or frequency, combining the drug with others,
using the medicine to treat an unapproved condition, or giving the medicine to someone for whom it was
not prescribed.16 It is nearly impossible to monitor for oﬀ-label use and Congress has never attempted to
outlaw its practice.17
Oﬀ-label prescription, in contrast, occurs when a doctor prescribes a drug in a manner inconsistent with its
FDA approved label.18 For example, a physician may prescribe a drug for a disease other than the ones
listed on the label, in an unapproved dosage, for unapproved duration or in an unapproved combination with
other medicines.19 The doctor may also prescribe the drug to groups, such as children or pregnant women,
for whom the FDA has not approved the drugs usage.20 While it would be easier to enforce a ban on oﬀ-label
prescription than it would be for oﬀ-label use, Congress has long deferred to a physician’s superior medical
judgment to prescribe medicine.21 Professor Salbu notes, “Numerous decisions support this approach, which
emphasizes physician autonomy and discretion within an otherwise rigorous regulatory environment.”22
The ﬁnal category, oﬀ-label promotion, will be the primary focus of this paper and is regulated by the
FDA. Manufacturers cannot market their products “for purposes, to users, in dosages, or in combinations
other than FDA-approved ones.”23 While recent legislation has created certain exceptions to this blanket
14Salbu, supra note 11, at 188.
15Id.
16Id.
17Id.
18Id. at 189.
19Id.
20Id.
21Id. at 189-190. See also infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
22Id. at 190 (citing Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharms. Inc. v. Marion Merrell Dow Inc., 93 F.3d 511, 514 n.3 (8th Cir. 1996);
Weaver v. Reagen, 886 F.2d 194, 198 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Evers, 453 F. Supp. 1141, 1149-50 (M.D. Ala. 1978),
aﬀ’d, 643 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1981)).
23Salbu, supra note 11, at 191.
5prohibition,24 the promotion of drugs for oﬀ-label uses remains both highly regulated and controversial.
It must be stressed that there is no doubt as to the legality oﬀ-label use or prescription.25 The only dispute
concerns the appropriateness of prescription drug manufacturers promoting oﬀ-label aspects of their product.
Attorneys Beck and Azari note that “[o]ﬀ-label use is widespread in the medical community and often is
essential to giving patients optimal medical care.... [M]edical ethics, FDA, and most courts recognize
[recognize this fact].”26 Moreover, the GAO reports that oﬀ-label use often represents “state-of-the-art”
treatment,”27 and the FDA asserts that “good medical practice and patient interests require that physicians
use commercially available drugs, devices, and biologics, according to their best knowledge and judgment.”28
Thus, the term ‘oﬀ-label’ is merely a regulatory description of a drug; it is a legal status not a medical fact.29
Furthermore, one should be careful not to interpret the phrase “unapproved use” to mean “disapproved
use.”30 The FDA does not take a position on the safety of an oﬀ-label use; rather, the agency leaves that
determination to the individual doctor as part of his or her practice of medicine. This position has been
stated repeatedly. For example, in a 1972 pronouncement, the FDA declared that once a drug has left a
manufacturer’s warehouse a “physician may, as part of the practice of medicine lawfully prescribe a diﬀerent
dosage for his patient, or may otherwise vary the conditions of use from those approved in the package
24See Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (codiﬁed at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 360aaa et seq.); infra notes 135-69 and accompanying text.
25United States General Accounting Oﬃce, Oﬀ-Label Drugs: Reimbursement Policies Constrain Physicians in Their Choice
of Cancer Therapies, Pub. No. GAO/PEMD-91-14, 11 (1991) (“It is not the ...[FDA’s] policy, intent, or bias to indicate that
oﬀ-label uses are wrong, improper or even investigational”).
26Beck & Azari, supra note 2, at 72 cited with approval in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiﬀs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 351
(2001).
27United States General Accounting Oﬃce, supra note 25, at 11.
28Beck & Azari, supra note 2, at 83 (quoting Food and Drug Admin., Investigational Use of Marketed Products (1989)).
29Id..
30Beck & Azari, supra note 2, at 84. This error is, nevertheless, a common one. For example, in Proctor v. Davis, 682
N.E.2d 1203, 1213 (Ill. App. 1997), the court described oﬀ-label use as “unauthorized” by the FDA, even though the agency
lacks power to forbid oﬀ-label use.
6insert.”31 Ten years later, the FDA again stressed that oﬀ-label use is accepted medical practice, and FDA
approved labeling should be used for informational purposes only.32 Physicians have embraced this freedom,
and oﬀ-label drug use has become an accepted method of treatment for many diseases.
III. Regulatory History
In 1938 Congress passed the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act33 (FDCA) to replace the 1906 Food and Drugs
Act.34 In doing so, the members of the 75th Congress ﬁrmly established the federal government’s role in
regulating the pharmaceutical industry and ensuring the safety of the nation’s prescription drug supply.
A. Practice of Medicine
During the debates leading to the FDCA’s passage, Congress made clear that while it intended to regulate
production and distribution of prescription drugs, it did not wish to regulate the practice of medicine.35 As
the Third Circuit has observed:
31Legal Status of Approved Labeling For Prescription Drugs; Prescribing For Uses Unapproved By The Food And Drug
Administration: Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503, 16,503-04 (Aug. 15, 1972).
32Use of Approved Drugs for Unlabeled Indications, FDA DRUG BULLETIN, Apr. 1982, at 4
33Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codiﬁed as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 – 392).
34The ﬁrst national statute regulating the general safety of prescription drugs was passed four years before the 1906 Act. The
Biologics Act of 1902 was passed in response to the distribution of tetanus infected diphtheria antitoxin and required licensing of
biological drugs sold in interstate commerce. Prior to the Biologics Act, Congress made several short-lived attempts to regulate
speciﬁc sectors of the prescription drug market, such as the safety of smallpox vaccine, 2 Stat. 806 (1813), repealed by 3 Stat.
677 (1822) and imported drugs 9 Stat. 237 (1848). See generally Peter Barton Hutt and Richard A. Merrill, FOOD & DRUG
LAW 7-9. (2d ed. 1991).
35For example, the Senate Report that accompanied the new law stated that “the bill is not intended as a medical practices
act and will not interfere with the practice of the healing art.” S. REP. No. 361, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1935).
7New Uses for drugs are often discovered after FDA approves the package inserts that explain
a drug’s approved uses. Congress would have created havoc in the practice of medicine had
it required physicians to follow the expensive and time-consuming procedure of obtaining
FDA approval before putting drugs to new uses. Thus, Congress exempted the practice of
medicine from the [FDCA] so as not to limit a physician’s ability to treat his patients.36
However, this distinction – between the practice of medicine on one hand and the promotion of drugs
on the other – has been a diﬃcult one to maintain. As mentioned above,37 federal regulations prohibit
pharmaceutical manufacturers from encouraging oﬀ-label use of their products, but if physicians learn of
and then utilize oﬀ-label uses, no law has been violated.38 The problem is that the prescription drug
industry and physicians work hand in hand to ﬁght disease and minister to the sick.39 In an era where
most diseases are treated with prescription drugs,40 it is diﬃcult to regulate the pharmaceutical industry
without interfering with a doctors’ ability to treat their patients as they see best. As a result, the law seems
to be in tension with itself. Oﬀ-label information must not be discussed, but physicians are free to use any
information they learn.
B. Labeling and Approval Requirements
The 1938 legislation required, inter alia, that manufacturers label their product with safety warnings and
directions for use.41 Over time, the FDA has come to understand this requirement as mandating that drug
manufacturers label their product with a descriptions of all intended uses.42 Thus, the agency has declared,
37See supra notes 31 and 32 and accompanying text.
38The Supreme Court has observed that oﬀ-label usage is “an accepted and necessary corollary of the FDA’s mission to
regulate in this area without directly interfering with the practice of medicine.” Buckman Co. v. Plaintiﬀs’ Legal Committee,
531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001) (emphasis added).
39Both sides, no doubt, have other motives as well.
40See Robin Toner, Drawing up Plans to Pay for Pills for the Elderly. NEW YORK TIMES, May 10, 1999, at A1.
41Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, Ch 675, §502(f), 52 Stat. 1040, 1051 (1938).
42Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientiﬁc and Educational Articles, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074, 64,075 (Dec. 3, 1997)
(“The courts have agreed with the agency that section 502(f)(1) of the act requires information not only on how a product is
to be used (e.g., dosage and administration), but also on all the intended uses of the product.”) (emphasis added). In support
8“All drugs and devices must bear labeling with adequate directions for each intended use. If labeling for a
drug or device fails to contain adequate directions for each intended use, the drug or device is deemed to be
misbranded ...and subject to seizure or other enforcement actions.”43
The FDCA deﬁnes labeling as “all labels and other written, printed, or graphic matters (1) upon any
article or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article.”44 This concept is understood
broadly;45 package inserts, brochures, and reprints of academic articles are all considered forms of labeling.46
It is not necessary for a manufacturer to include this information with the shipment of the actual passage
in order for it to be considered labeling.47
Amending the FDCA in 1962, Congress added requirements for manufacturers to not only show that their
product is safe – as had previously been required – but also that it is eﬀective for their intended use.48 These
amendments expanded the FDA’s power dramatically and “laid the foundation for the ...issue of oﬀ-label
promotion by specifying the type of clinical data that a manufacturer must submit for new drug approval and
by requiring such information for each intended use.”49 A manufacturer who wished to promote an already
approved product for a new use could no longer rely on previous studies to show that the “new” drug is just
as safe as the “old” one. Instead, the pharmaceutical company must prove that the product, already shown
to be safe, is eﬀective for the new treatment. As one commentator noted, the 1962 amendments “provide[]
of this claim, the agency cites Alberty Food Products v. United States, where the Ninth Circuit held that a manufacturer
misbrands a product when its label does not reﬂect the therapeutic uses suggested in newspaper advertisements. 185 F.2d 321
(9th Cir. 1950).
43Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientiﬁc and Educational Articles, supra n. 42 at 64,076.
4421 U.S.C. § 321(m) (2000).
45Elizabeth A. Weeks, Is It Worth It Worth It? The New Policy on Dissemination of Information on Oﬀ-Label Drug Use
Under the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 645, 647 (1999).
46Thomas A Hayes, Drug Labeling and Promotion: Evolution and Application of Regulatory Policy, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
57, 61 (1996).
47Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 350 (1948) (holding that a manufacturer who provides vendors with both the product
and brochures can be found guilty of misbranding even though the product and “label” were shipped separately. “The fact
that [the brochures] went in a diﬀerent mail was wholly irrelevant.”)
48Pub. L. No. 87-781, §102(a)(1), 76 Stat. 780 (amending 21 U.S.C. §321(p)(1)) (“The term ‘new drug’ is amended by
...inserting therein immediately after the words ‘to evaluate the safety’, the words “and eﬀectiveness.’ ...”)
49Weeks, supra note 45, at 654.
9a solid basis for what the FDA describes as a seamless regulatory regime in which pharmaceutical products
cannot be promoted or suggested for any use in the absence of labeling for that use approved by the FDA.”50
In addition to expanding the number of criteria on which a drug will be reviewed, the 1962 Amendments
also created a “substantial evidence” test.51 This too expanded the FDA’s authority for the agency could
now set standards for the type of clinical trials that a manufacturer must conduct and the quality of the
data that a manufacturer must submit with a new drug application.52
The combination of the safety, labeling, and eﬃcacy requirements have made the process of bringing a
new drug to market an arduous one.53 After completing animal testing, a manufacturer must complete an
investigational new drug (IND) application in order to receive an exemption from the blanket prohibition
against the introduction of unapproved drugs into interstate commerce.54 Accompanying this application,
the manufacturer must detail the general investigational plan, the design of human trials, and qualiﬁcations
of the clinical investigators.55
Testing on human subjects is divided into three phases.56 Phase I involves administering the new drug to a
small number of healthy subjects in order to determine its toxicity and other metabolic functions.57 Phase
II oﬀers the drug to a limited number of the anticipated patient population in order to determine eﬃcacy,
side eﬀects, and risk.58 Finally, Phase III trials are large-scale double blind studies of the drug’s eﬃcacy and
50Hayes, supra note 46, at 62.
5121 U.S.C. §355.
52Weeks, supra note 45, at 654.
53Compassionate use exceptions dramatically simplify the approval process for drugs intended for life-threatening illness with
no other treatment. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.34, 312.36, 312.80 (2003).
54Weeks, supra note 45, at 654-55. See also 21 C.F.R. § 312 (2003). (detailing investigational new drug application require-
ments)
55Weeks, supra note 45, at 655.
5621 C.F.R. § 312.21.
5721 C.F.R. § 312.21(a).
5821 C.F.R. § 312.21(b).
10safety in patients with the speciﬁed disease.59 At this stage, investigators compare the drug to a placebo,
information for the label is gathered, and beneﬁts and risks are calculated from a statistically signiﬁcant
population.60 During all three phases, of course, the clinical investigators must obtain informed consent
from the test subjects.61
If the new drug successfully completes this process, the manufacturer will submit a “New Drug Application”
(NDA).62 The NDA includes detailed information about the components of the drug, chemical reactions,
the result of clinical testing, a summary of risks and beneﬁts, and proposed labeling.63 Only then will the
FDA consider approving the new drug for wide-scale distribution. This process has led one commentator to
observe that “given the lengthy and expensive road to new drug approval, even for new uses of previously
approved products, drug manufacturers face strong disincentives against seeking permission to market oﬀ-
label uses of their product.”64
While time consuming and expensive,65 this process has achieved its goal. The nation’s drug supply is both
safe and eﬀective. Oﬀ-label drug promotion presents diﬃculties because it deals with an area at the cusp
of the law – the interaction between the regulated pharmaceutical industry and the unregulated66 practice
of medicine. While manufacturers must carefully follow detailed federal regulations for promoting oﬀ-label
5921 C.F.R. § 312.21(c).
60See generally Weeks at 655 (describing the three phases)
61See 21 C.F.R. 50.20 and 50.25 (describing requirement for and elements of informed consent)
62See 21 C.F.R. 314
6321 C.F.R 314.50
64Weeks, supra note 45, at 655-56.
65A 1980 report from the House Committee on Science and Technology estimated that seven to thirteen years and 30 to 50
million dollars are needed in order to bring a drug from research to marketing approval. Weeks, supra note 45, at 655 (citing
Report of the Subcommittee on Science, Research and Technology of the House Committee on Science and Technology, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980)).
66This phrase is not to suggest that medicine is an unregulated industry. Indeed any physician who has had to contend with
the Anti-Kickback Laws (42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b) ¸Stark Laws (42 U.S.C. § 1395nn), Medicare regulations, Medicaid regulations,
state licensing requirements, and malpractice lawsuits is well aware that medicine is highly regulated. Rather, what is signiﬁcant
for the purposes of this paper is that Congress, by way of the FDCA, makes no attempt to regulate the daily practice of medicine
– the dozens of decisions a doctor must make when evaluating, diagnosing, treating, and caring for a patient.
11uses, the practice of medicine exception allows doctors to prescribe oﬀ-label uses as they see best.67
III. The Policy Debate and the Legislative Response
A. Arguments Against Regulation Congress has had a diﬃcult time creating a
coherent policy for oﬀ-label drugs because both the arguments in favor of regulation and those against are
strong. Perhaps the best argument in favor of relaxing regulations is necessity. Many drugs have important
oﬀ-label uses and government restrictions merely prevent needed medicine from reaching the sick. As the
American Medical Association testiﬁed before Congress:
Prescribing FDA-approved drugs for oﬀ-label uses often is necessary for optimal patient
care. For a product to have the most eﬀective potential beneﬁts, law and regulation ...must
follow, not precede, science. There are too many variations in clinical circumstances and
too much time delay in regulations to allow the government to impede the physician’s
ability to practice in these regards when it is medically appropriate.68
Indeed, FDA’s deference to the “practice of medicine” represents an intuitive understanding of this argument.
The ultimate goal of the FDCA is to protect patients, and few patients will beneﬁt if their physicians cannot
prescribe medicine as they see best. Similarly, the FDA’s policy of granting exceptions for life-threatening
illnesses that have no cure reﬂects the agency’s partial acceptance of a necessity argument.69
67A doctor’s oﬀ-label use of a product is “part of the ‘practice of medicine’ [and] does not require the submission of an
Investigational New Drug Application ...or review by an IRB [Institutional Review Board] unless such review is required
by the institution in which the product will be used.” Beck & Azari, supra note 2, at 83 (quoting Food and Drug Admin.,
Investigational Use of Marketed Products (1989)).
12Moreover, this intuitive understanding is supported by empirical research. As discussed above,70 the vast
majority of cancer medications have important oﬀ-label uses. Also, children and patients with uncommon or
“orphan diseases” rely on oﬀ-label drugs. In fact, among diseases aﬄicting fewer than 200,000 Americans,
most are “totally without” FDA approved treatment,71 and among drugs in general, “prescriptions for oﬀ-
label uses ...may account for more than 25% of the approximately 1.6 billion prescriptions written each
year, with some recent estimates running as high as 60%.72
Thus, many opponents of FDA regulation argue that promoting oﬀ-label uses allows patients access to
potentially life saving treatments. If doctors were not made aware of alternative uses to medicines the FDA
has already approved, patients would have to go without adequate care. Since many doctors receive large
amounts of information from pharmaceutical companies, placing restrictions on the dissemination of this
information, it is argued, would only lead to sub-optimal patient care.73
13Some respond to this argument by suggesting that doctors should augment their medical knowledge through
careful study of the medical literature, rather than listening to drug companies promote their products.
Senator Bill Frist, however, responds to these critics by noting that “if a conscientious doctor were to read
two medical articles before retiring every night, he would have fallen 550 years behind in his reading at the
end of the ﬁrst year.”74
Related to the necessity argument, opponents of regulation contend that more information will aide doctors
in treating patients. Once it is accepted that “oﬀ-label uses are desirable, it is diﬃcult to maintain that
doctors should be shielded from truthful information concerning how to use a product for an oﬀ-label use.
Patients will beneﬁt from having their doctors informed about oﬀ-label uses.”75 Furthermore, rather than
relying anecdotal evidence passed informally between colleagues, pharmaceutical manufacturers should be
able to provide physicians with authoritative scientiﬁc information.76 As one commentator argues, “the
diﬀerence between a deadly poison and a useful medicine is the knowledge of how it should be used to treat
a particular condition.”77
A third argument against regulation notes the time and expense needed for FDA approval of new uses of
existing drugs.78 If every use of a drug were subject to extensive FDA oversight, manufacturers would incur
signiﬁcant new research and development expenses.79 Either the cost of the drug would increase signiﬁcantly
or manufacturers would simply not inform physicians of the full range of usefulness of the drug.80 Neither
outcome is desirable. Either patients who need medicine will suﬀer, or the cost of health in the United
States, already among the highest in the industrialized world,81 will grow even higher.
14Next, opponents of greater regulation argue that the FDA could make better use of its limited resources by
concentrating on the initial approval of prescription drugs. For example, former House Commerce Committee
counsel Alan Slobodin has argued that the FDA unnecessarily spends resources on issues, like oﬀ-label drugs,
which are tangential to its “core mission.”82 The FDA, he contends, should focus on swift assessment of new
drugs. This would hasten the pace of medical innovation – a beneﬁt to both consumers and manufacturers –
and would ultimately reduce the FDA’s overall costs.83 Furthermore, these savings, might free government
resources to be spent on other areas of public concern such as medical research or tax credits that encourage
pharmaceutical innovation.84
A related argument maintains that the FDA is not capable of approving the multitude of oﬀ-label uses in the
prescription drug marketplace. The agency neither has the ﬁnancial resources nor the personnel to review
each use. As Christopher writes, the FDA could not possibly “review drugs in its lengthy testing process at
a pace equal to that at which physicians discover beneﬁcial oﬀ-label uses.”85
15Critics argue that less regulation will also lower costs for consumers. Professor Beales, for example, draws an
analogy from state policies on advertising for prescription eyeglasses.86 He notes that in a recent study, the
average price of eyeglasses was approximately 20 percent higher in states that prohibited advertising than
those with regulation.87 Advertising led to increased sales, which in turn brought additional manufacturers
into the market, led to competition, and lowered prices.88 A study conducted in the 1970s found similar
phenomenon in pharmaceutical marketing.89
Finally, opponents of regulation contend that the FDA’s policies stiﬂe innovation.90 Research on new uses
for existing medicines requires manufacturers to invest considerable resources, and the investment is risky
because not all research will produce favorable results.91 Moreover, even if a new use were to be discovered,
the manufacturer may not recover enough money from new sales in order to justify the initial expenditure.92
While the preceding cost beneﬁt analysis is an inevitable result of a market economy, critics argue that the
government should not add additional expense by ordering manufacturers to satisfy the FDA’s numerous
requirements.93
Furthermore, pharmaceutical manufacturers evaluate the beneﬁts of additional research in the shadow of
the remaining length of their patent. “Subjecting a new use to a lengthy approval process will decrease the
amount of time the patent will cover the new use,”94 which may inﬂuence whether the manufacturers decide
to perform additional research to begin with.95 In fact, one writer argues that the unpatented status of
aspirin hindered the public education as to its cardiac beneﬁts.96 No one was willing to incur the research
expense needed to prove that aspirin’s “new” use was eﬀective.97 Thus, as one attorney notes, “as ...[with]
many aspects of this industry, proﬁt-making and scientiﬁc innovation are mutually advancing goals.”98
B. Arguments for Regulation
16On the other side of the debate are supporters of government regulation. These critics note that an unregu-
lated pharmaceutical industry has been responsible for many tragedies, and the modern regulatory scheme
arose in response to the industry’s malfeasance.99 Any eﬀort to circumvent these regulations, critics contend,
will weaken consumer protections.100 Indeed, the FDA has long argued that permitting manufacturers to
promote oﬀ-label uses would “remove incentives to obtain deﬁnitive clinical study data, weaken the goal of
evidence-based medicine, erode the drug eﬃcacy requirements, and harm patients.”101
Furthermore, critics argue, doctors are not as capable as the FDA at evaluating safety and eﬃcacy. The
very companies that stand to beneﬁt from favorable result often ﬁnance research, and conﬂicts of interest
are seldom disclosed.102 Without the government’s intervention, manufacturers would lack an incentive to
conduct scientiﬁcally rigorous and statistically powerful research.103 Moreover, good results, it is noted,
generate favorable attention in the medical community even if the science does not reach the exacting
standards set by the FDA.104 In an area as complex and important as pharmaceutical research, the public
should not have to trust a biased entity’s assertions of safety. If there were ever a role for government, this
is it.105
Many of these arguments were raised in 1997 when Congress debated amendments to the FDCA that would
change the way oﬀ-label promotion is regulated.106 Public Citizen, for example, asserted that the proposed
law would provide “dangerously inadequate protection for the American public from the substantial risks
of unknowingly being prescribed drugs for oﬀ-label uses.”107 Physicians also testiﬁed that drug companies
emphasize positive results and omit information about side-eﬀects, contraindications, adverse reactions and
warnings.108
17Supporters of regulation also argue that, in some instances, the only incentive for conducting further research
comes from a desire to promote a drug’s newly discovered use.109 If there were no prohibitions on oﬀ-label
marketing, there would be minimal research about the safety of oﬀ-label uses. While it is acknowledged
that additional statutory requirements inhibit a pharmaceutical manufacturer’s ability to recoup resources
invested in research, this fact, critics contend, could be used against all forms of FDA regulation.110 Society
long ago decided that the beneﬁt of pharmaceutical regulation outweighs the detriments. Consumers are
rarely more vulnerable and less knowledgeable than when they seek medical care, and the government has
a responsibility to protect this vulnerability.111 While the pharmaceutical industry cannot be faulted for
earning a proﬁt, the FDA should do for consumers what they cannot do by themselves.
Next, critics contend that oﬀ-label drugs are essentially experimental medicines, and the patients who
receive them are unwitting guinea pigs.112 Patients who receive these drugs “become part of an uncontrolled
experiment where no one is keeping track of ...who’s helped and who’s hurt.”113 Physician, insurance,
and public interest organizations have all endorsed this view.114 Manufacturers retort that oﬀ-label uses
are promoted only if scientiﬁcally valid studies have proven the safety and eﬃcacy of the new use.115 Yet
critics contend that without FDA’s endorsement of this research, the results cannot be trusted and patients
are exposed to medicine that diﬀers very little from that which might be encountered in a phase III clinical
trial.116
18Supporters of increased regulation also argue that manufacturers abuse a regulatory loophole by only seeking
FDA approval for uses that easily satisfy the agency’s safety criteria.117 Once the FDA has endorsed
the product, the manufacturer then markets the drug to a far broader patient population than originally
suggested.118 Indeed, before passage of the 1997 reforms, the FDA expressed concern that if oﬀ-label
marketing were allowed, manufacturers would seek approval for a “cheap, narrow indication and the next
day begin selling the drug for multiple, broad, and proﬁtable indications.”119
Underlining these arguments is a belief that the market will not limit the promotion of drug to those uses
that are safe an eﬀective. This market failure, it is suggested, results from the conﬂicts of interest found
throughout the pharmaceutical world.120 Indeed, manufacturers, scientists, and physicians all face multiple
and contradictory incentives.
Manufacturer’s conﬂicts are perhaps the most obvious. As Professor Salbu explains, “If drug companies
were in the business of protecting the public ...[they] would spend their vast resources hiring personnel to
achieve this end.... Drug companies, however, are in the business of selling pharmaceutical products for
a proﬁt, and the pressures to do this eﬀectively can tempt companies to take imprudent risks with public
health.”121 Government regulation, therefore, is needed to guard against these risks.
Although more objective than pharmaceutical manufacturers, scientists also display conﬂicts of interest.122
Drug companies ﬁnance a considerable amount of scientiﬁc research123 and scientists may feel pressure to
arrive at favorable results.124 Moreover, when experiments do produce legitimately favorable data, scientists
often fail to disclose their ﬁnancial ties to the manufacturer.125 Finally, even without a ﬁnancial stake in
their sponsor’s product, scientists who discover a new use may encourage physicians to prescribe the drug
in what is technically still an oﬀ-label manner both to perform a public service and to enhance their own
reputation.126
19Doctors, who some argue will always protect patients from dangerous or useless drugs, face conﬂicts of their
own. Pharmaceutical manufacturers frequently lobby physicians to prescribe their drug.127 Tactics range
from seminars in exotic locations to free lunches in the oﬃce.128 While most physicians truly believe their
professional judgment is not swayed, it is hard to believe that the drug industry would incur this expense if
it did not have some eﬀect on sales.
Additionally, doctors also face pressure to prescribe speciﬁc drugs from their patients.129 Federal laws
governing direct to consumer advertising have recently been relaxed,130 and “today’s patients are bombarded
by the eﬀorts of pharmaceutical manufacturers to spur user demand.”131 Patients increasingly come to the
doctor believing they have a condition advertised on television and that the appropriate treatment is the
advertised product.132 Physicians, at times, report that they prescribe these medicines if the patient is
persistent, even if the drug is not necessary.133 The combined pressure of manufacturers and patients
will, at times, overwhelm even the mot conscientious of physicians and drugs that are either not needed
or potentially harmful will be prescribed. Critics warn that relaxing oﬀ-label marketing restrictions will
only exacerbate this problem.134 Accordingly, doctors, like pharmaceutical manufacturers and scientists,
should not be entrusted with the public’s health. Although no party in the pharmaceutical industry would
deliberately cause harm, only the government can truly monitor all prescription drugs and ﬁlter out dangerous
or ineﬀective uses.
C. Compromise
20As part of a broader overhaul of the Food and Drug administration,135 and partly in response to the ar-
guments discussed above, Congress passed the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997
(FDAMA).136 While not removing all restrictions on oﬀ-label marketing, the law does facilitate the distribu-
tion of information from the pharmaceutical industry to physicians. The FDAMA, which has been described
as “the most important change in drug regulation in 20 years”137 seeks to “balance the interests of physicians
– and correspondingly of their patients – to obtain legitimate information about drug uses against FDA’s
continued interest in ensuring that manufacturers continue to study drug eﬀectiveness.”138
21Signiﬁcantly, the FDAMA permits manufacturers of an FDA approved drug to distribute information about
new uses for that drug.139 However, this information must be in one of two forms: an unabridged reprint
of a peer-reviewed journal article or a reprint of a reference publication that experts in the ﬁeld consider
scientiﬁcally sound.140 The peer-reviewed articles must be indexed in the “Index Medicus of the National
Library of Medicine of the National Institutes of Health.”141 The distribution must be accompanied by a
disclosure statement that identiﬁes the reprint as information regarding an unapproved use, notes that the
manufacturer has sponsored the distribution, and identiﬁes any author or consultant who has ﬁnancial ties
to the manufacturer.142
Manufacturers may only distribute information from journals that have a publicly stated policy of disclosing
authors’ conﬂicts of interest.143 Moreover, distributed material cannot be funded by, written at the request
of, or inﬂuenced by the manufacturer.144 The information distributed also cannot be false or misleading.145
Under the new law, manufacturers can only distribute the information to health care practitioners, pharmacy
beneﬁt managers, health insurance issuers, group health plans, and government agencies.146 Notably absent
from this list are patients and consumer groups. The FDA must be informed of the intended distribution
before it occurs and must be provided with a copy of both the article and clinical data regarding the safety
and eﬀectiveness of the new use.147
A manufacturer who chooses to take advantage of these new provisions must have received or be in the
process of seeking supplemental FDA approval for the new use.148 This last requirement, though, will be
waived if a manufacturer can show that it would be economically prohibitive or unethical to conduct the
studies needed for a supplemental application.149 Every six months the manufacturer must inform the FDA
of the articles that have been distributed and the recipients of the information.150 The FDA may, in turn,
order a manufacturer to halt distribution if the agency determines that the restrictions described above have
not been complied with or the new use is not eﬀective or creates a public health risk.151
The FDA announced the rules to implement this law approximately one year later.152 As part of its
mandate to ensure that promotional materials do not pose a public health risk or contain false or misleading
information, the agency placed additional restrictions on the types of articles or reference publications that
manufacturers can distribute.153 Letters to the editor, abstracts of publications, and “ﬂagged reference
material” contain little substantive discussion, the agency concluded, and therefore are not “scientiﬁcally
sound” or appropriate for dissemination.154 Studies on healthy people or on four or fewer subjects were also
rejected.155 In order to assist physicians in evaluating the trustworthiness of distributed material, the FDA
required the disclosure statement to identify all sources of funding the research received.156
One of the most important parts of the compromise that led to the FDAMA were sections that required
manufacturers who chose to distribute information on new uses to begin the process of seeking supplemental
approval of that new use.157 Indeed, during the Senate ﬂoor debate, Senator Kennedy remarked that while
pharmaceutical companies will be able to circulate studies aﬃrming the eﬃcacy of oﬀ-label uses, the new
law will “ultimately enhance the public’s health and safety because the FDA will be given the opportunity
to review, comment on, and approve articles which the companies circulate.”158
The FDA, therefore, decided to interpret the two exceptions to agency review narrowly.159 Additional
studies will be considered “economically prohibitive” if there are insuﬃcient existing data to support a
supplemental application and the cost of producing this data would be greater than the expected proﬁts
generated from the new use.160 In order to meet the “unethical” exemption, a manufacturer must show that
existing studies are not suﬃcient to support a supplemental application, and that additional studies would
present an unreasonable risk to human subjects.161 When evaluating requests for an ethics exception, the
FDA will consider the prevalence and acceptance of the new use in the medical community.162
22The FDAMA was a political compromise between those who favored greater restrictions on oﬀ-label mar-
keting and those who hoped to facilitate its practice.163 “As are most political compromises, the FDAMA is
rather cumbersome.”164 Indeed, some have wondered whether the new law is too burdensome and whether
“anyone would ever run this gauntlet.”165
The statute, though, does balance two competing interests: the need to provide information to physicians
and concerns that increased communication will threaten safety. For example, as discussed above, critics
fear that oﬀ-label marketing will reduce a manufacturer’s incentive to conduct research on the safety and
eﬀectiveness of new uses.166 The legislation responds to this concern by requiring the manufacturer to sub-
mit a supplemental application for the oﬀ-label use.167 Moreover, even this compromise is tempered by an
exception for studies that are economically infeasible or medically unethical. Likewise, the disclosure require-
ments address concerns that manufacturers are inherently biased, and the source requirements – distributed
material can only be reprints from scientiﬁcally respected journals – address concerns that corporations will
provide skewed or incomplete information. Finally as the ultimate safeguard, the FDA can order a manu-
facturer to cease distributing materials if the agency has doubts about the safety or eﬀectiveness of the new
use or if other provisions of the FDAMA have not been followed.168
By passing the FDAMA, Congress left in place the existing regulations for new drug approval and simply
added a new layer of rules to govern oﬀ-label marketing.169 The new law, combined with the practice of
medicine exception discussed above, reﬂects a diﬃcult policy choice between two views that both arguably
have consumers’ best interests at heart. While the legislative branch has likely said its last word on this
subject for some time, the courts have only begun to evaluate the current regulatory scheme.
IV. First Amendment Challenges
A. The Washington Legal Foundation Case
23Two recent cases have important First Amendment implications for oﬀ-label drug regulation. The ﬁrst,
Washington Legal Foundation v Friedman resulted in ﬁve decisions addressing the merits of the case and
over six years of litigation. Despite its complexity, the case essentially revolved around one question: Is it
unconstitutional for the FDA to limit pharmaceutical manufacturers’ ability to promote an oﬀ-label use of
an otherwise legal product.
In 1994, the Washington Legal Foundation (WLF), a not-for-proﬁt public interest group that “defends the
rights of individuals and businesses to go about their aﬀairs without undue inﬂuence from government reg-
ulators”170 ﬁled a lawsuit to challenge the FDA’s then “unformalized” policy of prohibiting pharmaceutical
manufacturers from promoting oﬀ-label uses.171 While the FDA had not yet produced ﬁnal guidance docu-
ments on the subject,172 the policy was evident from letters to manufacturers, speeches and articles authored
by agency oﬃcials.173
WLF represented physicians (who were also members of the organization) who felt the FDA violated their
First Amendment rights when it prohibited manufacturers from distribution information the doctors wished
to receive. Notably, no manufacturers were named as plaintiﬀs,174 and the FDA immediately challenged
the case on standing and ripeness grounds.175 The court, however, held that because WLF’s members
170Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, 13. F. Supp. 2d 51, 54 (D.D.C. 1998) [hereinafter WLF II] (citing to Plaintiﬀ’s
complaint).
171Richard M. Cooper, The WLF Case Thus Far: Not with a Bang, But a Whimper, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
477, 477. The suit was preceded by a 1993 citizen’s petition ﬁled with the FDA challenging the agency’s policies on
constitutional grounds. WLF I at 30. The petition was ﬁled pursuant to 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 and can be found at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/01/May01/053001/cp00001.pdf
172As of 1992, the agency did have formal policy on manufacturer support of continuing medical education (CME) See Draft
Policy Statement on Industry-Supported Scientiﬁc and Educational Activities
ACTION: Notice, 57 Fed. Reg. 56,412 (Nov. 27, 1992). CME is often linked with more formal means of promotion since
manufacturers might use the “courses” to promote their product.
173Washington Legal Foundation v. Kessler, 880 F. Supp. 26, 28-29 (D.D.C. 1995) [hereinafter WLF I]. See also Cooper,
supra note 177, at 477 n.2 (listing informal ways this policy was communicated).
174Cooper, supra note 177, at 477.
175See WLF I, supra note 173.
24had standing,176 the organization also had standing to represent them.177 Moreover, the alleged “collective
eﬀect of the FDA’s conduct [was] ...to discourage manufacturers from disseminating information they would
otherwise have chosen to distribute” and accordingly the issue was ripe for judicial review.178
In response to this decision, the FDA released ﬁnal guidance documents detailing agency policy regard-
ing (1) manufacturer distribution via “enduring materials” of information concerning oﬀ-label uses179 and
(2) continuing medical education seminars and symposia.180 “Enduring materials” are reprints of articles
published in medical journals, scientiﬁc journals, or medical textbooks.181 These guidance documents were
viewed by all parties as superseding the FDA’s prior unwritten policy and they became the “central focus”
of the lawsuit.182
Following the discovery process, both parties moved for summary judgment, and in July 1998 Judge Royce
176The court cited Virigna Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1975) for the notion that when a
willing speaker exists, both the listener and speaker have a First Amendment right to the speech.
177WLF I, supra note 173, at 31 (citing Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (holding
that an organization has “representational” standing to sue on behalf of its members provided that there is an injury-in-fact to
at least one of the members)).
178WLF I, supra note 173, at 35-36. The court based its decision on numerous warning letters sent to pharmaceutical companies
and comments from Commissioner David Kessler that he “would urge all members of the pharmaceutical industry to take a
long hard look at their promotional practices. I do not expect companies to wait until this guidance document becomes ﬁnal to
put their advertising and promotional houses in order.” Id. Also, WLF alleged that the FDA Director of Policy Development
wrote, “Although this document was published as a draft policy statement with an invitation to submit comments, it reﬂects
actual agency policy. It tells you how the agency makes decisions from day to day in determining whether activities are subject
to regulation and are potentially illegal under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.” Id.
179Advertising and Promotion; Guidances, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,800 (Oct. 8, 1996). The guidance document states that distributed
articles must focus primarily on approved uses and can not be “written, edited, excerpted, or published speciﬁcally for, or at
the request of” a drug manufacturer. Id. at 52,800 – 801. The text also may not solely focus on the manufacturer’s product
and the manufacturer may not edit, comment on, or inﬂuence the text of the article. Id. Finally, the manufacturer may not
“refer to or otherwise promote...information in the reference text that is not consistent with the approved labeling for the
product.” Id. An exception was allowed for articles written by or inﬂuenced by the manufacturer if “the reference text results
in a balanced presentation of the subject matter.” Id. An exception was also granted for articles provided to a physician after
a direct inquiry. Id. For a more detailed summary, see WLF II, supra note 170, at 58.
180Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientiﬁc and Educational Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. 64074 (Dec. 3, 1997). The doc-
ument attempted to distinguish between situations in which the CME was independent from the inﬂuence of the manufacturer,
and therefore not subject to regulation, and situations where the manufacturer does exert inﬂuence. Id. at 64095. For a more
detailed summary see WLF II, supra note 170, at 57.
181WLF II, supra note 170 at 54.
182Cooper, supra note 171, at 479.
25Lamberth ruled for WLF on the merits.183 While the FDA had argued that it was merely regulating conduct,
the court found that the case concerned the promotion of oﬀ-label uses and that promotion is speech.184
Judge Lamberth did, however, grant the FDA’s contention that the regulated speech was commercial speech
rather than pure speech.185 The regulations, therefore, were only subject to intermediate scrutiny as outlined
by Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York186 and did not face a
more rigorous strict scrutiny test.
This last ﬁnding – that the speech was commercial - while preliminary in nature, was extremely signiﬁcant.
As the Supreme Court has explained, “The Constitution accords less protection to commercial speech than to
other constitutionally safeguarded forms of express.”187 Moreover, the answer was also not readily apparent.
The district court noted that the question was “not an easy one, as the communications present one of those
complex mixtures of commercial and non-commercial elements.”188 Indeed, the manufacturers hoped to
“communicate ...the speech of others – the work product of scientists, physicians, and other academics”189
and scientiﬁc information is given full constitutional protection.190
Central Hudson outlines a four-part test for evaluating whether restrictions placed on commercial speech
are unconstitutional: 1) the commercial speech “must concern lawful activity and not be misleading;” 2)the
government’s interesting regulating the speech must be “substantial;” 3) the restrictions must directly ad-
vance the government’s interest; and 4)the regulations must be no “more extensive than is necessary” to
183See WLF II supra note 170.
184Id. at 59. (“This court is hard pressed to believe that the agency is seriously contending that ‘promotion’ of an activity is
conduct and not speech, or that ‘promotion’ is entitled to no First Amendment protection.”) The government, of course, has
far greater latitude to regulate conduct than it does to regulate speech.
185Id. at 62-65.
186447 U.S. 557 (1980).
187Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1983).
188WLF II, supra note 170, at 62.
189WLF II, supra note, at 62 (citing First National Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978) (holding that speech
does not lose First Amendment protection merely because it was uttered by a corporation)). It was thought that the Supreme
Court might clarify this issue further in Nike v. Kasky, 156 L. Ed. 2d 580, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003), but the Court dismissed
the case on procedural grounds.
190See A. Elizabeth Blackwell & James M. Beck, Drug Manufacturers First Amend Right to Advertise and Promote Their
Products for Oﬀ-Label Use: Avoiding a Pyrrhic Victory, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 439, 446 (2003).
26accomplish the government’s objective.191
Applying the ﬁrst prong, the court found that the speech was neither unlawful nor misleading.192 While the
FDA had argued that drugs must be considered misbranded and therefore illegal if they are promoted for
oﬀ-label use, Judge Lamberth rejected this argument as tautological.193 The proper question, he explained,
is “not whether the speech violates a law or regulation, but whether the conduct that the speech promotes
violates the law”194 Since oﬀ-label prescription and oﬀ-label use are both lawful, the government could not
make use of this prong. The court similarly dismissed the FDA’s contention that the promotions would be
misleading: “In asserting that any and all scientiﬁc claims about the safety, eﬀectiveness, contraindications,
side eﬀects, and the like regarding prescription drugs are presumptively untruthful or misleading until the
FDA has had the opportunity to evaluate them, FDA exaggerates its overall place in the universe.”195 Thus,
while manufacturer’s claims on labels or promotional materials are subject to FDA regulatory authority,
conclusions reached by scientists in peer-review journals are not misleading simply because the FDA has not
approved them.196 “The FDA is not a peer review mechanism for the scientiﬁc community.”197
Next, the court had little diﬃculty determining that the government’s interest was substantial. Few things
are more important, Judge Lamberth wrote, than “ensuring that when a citizen takes a prescription drug,
that individual has absolute assurance that the product is safe and eﬀective for the condition for which his
physician has prescribed it.”198 He further noted that the Supreme Court has consistently held that the
government has a substantial interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens.199 The court also
acknowledged that the government has an interest in providing manufacturers with an incentive to receive
191Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-66.
192WLF II, supra note 170, at 69.
193Id. at 66.
194Id. (citing 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 497 n.7).
195Id. at 67.
196Id.
197Id. (quoting Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, Liberating Commercial Speech: Product Labeling Controls and the First
Amendment, 47 FLA. L. REV. 63, 96 (1995)).
198WLF II, supra note 170, at 69.
199Id.
27approval for previously unsanctioned uses, but rejected the FDA’s claim that there is a substantial govern-
ment interest in ensuring that unbiased information is disseminated to physicians.200
Similarly, the FDA satisﬁed the third prong of the Central Hudson test; the agency’s policy directly advanced
the substantial government interest.201 The FDA’s regulations limiting a manufacturer’s ability to promote
oﬀ-label uses, encourage the manufacturer to seek supplemental approval of newly discovered uses. “[O]ne
of the few mechanisms available to FDA to compel manufacturer behavior is to constrain their marketing
options.”202 Thus, if a manufacturer is proscribed from distributing enduring materials that discuss an
oﬀ-label use of the manufacturer’s product, “that proscription provides a strong incentive to get the use
on-label.”203
Nevertheless, the court deemed the regulations unconstitutional because they were more extensive than nec-
essary.204 While the FDA did not need to prove that it employed the least restrictive means possible, at
it would have had to under strict scrutiny, the agency’s regulations could not burden “substantially more
speech than necessary.”205 Requiring “full, complete, and unambiguous disclosure by the manufacturer”
would accomplish the agency’s goals without unduly burdening commercial speech.206 The disclosure would
alert physicians to the oﬀ-label status of the promoted use while still allowing the manufacturer could com-
municate its message. Moreover, the FDA’s goal of ensuring compliance with the overall regulatory structure
would not be hindered. “There still are enormous diﬀerences between the permitted marketing of on-label as
opposed to oﬀ-label uses.”207 For instance, manufacturers may not distribute internally-produced marketing
200Id. at 69 – 71. The court rejected the FDA’s second contention because of its paternalistic assumption that the medical
community needs to be protected from truthful commercial information. Id. at 69-70. The Supreme Court has noted that
“the First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the
government perceives to be their own good.” 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 503.
201WLF II, supra note 170 at 71.
202Id. at 72
203Id.
204Id.
205Id. (quoting United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 430 (1993)).
206Id. at 73
207Id.
28literature to physicians in order to promote oﬀ-label uses. Pharmaceutical companies also many not engage
in direct-to-consumer advertising to increase demand for oﬀ-label uses.208 Finally, the FDA approval is an
important indication of safety and eﬀectiveness. Physicians will take notice of this endorsement – or the lack
there of – and manufacturers will seek it.209
The FDA’s policy of restricting oﬀ-label promotion was therefore held unconstitutional210 and the court used
its injunctive power to specify the realm of manufacturer activity protected by the First Amendment.211 Un-
der the terms of the injunction, the FDA could not “in any way prohibit, restrict, sanction, or otherwise
seek to limit any pharmaceutical ...manufacturer:
from disseminating ...[to] medical professionals any articles concerning prescription drugs
...published in a bona ﬁde peer-reviewed professional journal, regardless of whether such
article includes a signiﬁcant or exclusive focus on uses of drugs ...other than those approved
by FDA.... 212
Similarly, the FDA could not prohibit manufacturers from dissemination articles from reference textbooks
regardless of whether the article dealt with an oﬀ-label use.213 Finally the FDA was ordered not to prevent
manufacturers from suggesting content or speakers to independent CME providers, regardless of whether
the content or speaker would address oﬀ-label uses.214
Judge Lamberth did, however, add one note of caution at the end of his opinion. Nothing in the injunction,
he wrote, should be construed to limit the FDA’s ability to enforce laws and regulations prohibiting the
distribution of false or misleading material.215 Moreover, the FDA is free to insist that manufacturers
disclose their ﬁnancial interest in the subject of the distributed material and that fact that the FDA has not
approved the discussed uses.216
208Id.
209Id.
210Id. at 74
211Cooper, supra note 171, at 479.
29The injunction, however, did not end the case. One year later a third WLF decision was announced in
which Judge Lamberth made clear that his earlier injunction also applied to the newly passed FDAMA.217
Although the FDAMA “altered to some extent” the FDA’s policies on oﬀ-label uses, the constitutional
analysis remained the same and the new law was held unconstitutional.218
The stage was thus set for an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals. In a decision that has been described as
unclear219 and confusing,220 the Circuit Court dismissed the FDA’s appeal and vacated the district court’s
decisions and injunctions “insofar as they declare the FDAMA ...unconstitutional.”221 Curiously, the court
did not reach the merits of the case. Rather, as a result of the government’s clariﬁcation of its position
during oral arguments, the court found that “the dispute between the parties ...disappeared before our
eyes.” The case thus no longer presented a controversy to be resolved and was dismissed.
30The court based its reasoning on the FDA’s declaration that the FDAMA “established nothing more than a
‘safe harbor’ ensuring that certain forms of conduct would not be used against manufacturers in misbranding
and ‘intended use’ enforcement actions based on pre-existing legislative authority.”222 In other words, the
agency declared that the new law did not authorize it to restrict speech, but merely created an exception
to the oﬀ-label restrictions already found in the FDCA for certain types of marketing. Since the FDAMA
did not restrict speech, there was no need to apply the intermediate scrutiny found in the Hudson test or,
for that matter, to determine whether the speech at issue was commercial (regulation of which requires
intermediate scrutiny) or scientiﬁc (necessitating strict scrutiny.)
While this interpretation of the FDAMA was ambiguous in the FDA’s brief, the agency stated “deﬁnitively”
during oral arguments that Act did not regulate speech.223 In fact, when the court noted that one section
speciﬁcally prohibited “the dissemination of information in violation of section 360aaa” 224 [(which describes
the manner in which a manufacturer may legally disseminate oﬀ-label information) and thus, on its face,
seemed to restrict speech, the counsel for the agency responded that the provision simply declares that “a
manufacturer who disregards section 360aaa’s conditions cannot avail itself of the FDAMA safe harbor, and
might be liable in some fashion if it breached an agreement with the Secretary pursuant to that section.”225
Thus, as the court explained, “were a pharmaceutical company to send out reprints of an article devoted to its
drug’s oﬀ-label uses to thousands of physicians tomorrow, the government agreed – indeed stipulated – that
the agency would draw no independent prosecutorial authority from FDAMA to buttress any enforcement
proceedings.”226
31Upon learning the FDA’s position, counsel for WLF stated that his client no longer had a constitutional
objection to the FDAMA.227 Since both parties agreed that the statute did not violate the First Amendment,
the court dismissed the case.228 The court was clear that “the government has announced here nothing less
than an oﬃcial interpretation of the FDAMA which the agency may not change unless it proves a reasoned
explanation for doing so.”229
These rulings produced a ﬂurry of scholarship230 and some confusion within the pharmaceutical industry.231
Much of the confusion can be traced to the court’s cryptic ﬁnal footnote:
“In disposing of the case in this manner, we certainly do not criticize the reasoning or
conclusions of the district court. As we have made clear, we do not reach the merits of the
district court’s First Amendment holdings and part of its injunction still stands.”232
Thus, although the circuit court vacated the injunctions and dismissed the case, it appeared to approve of
the lower court’s constitutional analysis.233
Shortly after the Circuit Court decision, the FDA clariﬁed in a Federal Register notice its policy on oﬀ-label
drug promotion.234 The agency aﬃrmed the safe harbor theory235 and concluded that it may “proceed, in
the context of case-by-case enforcement, to determine from a manufacturer’s written materials and activities
how it intends that its products be used.”236 If a drug manufacturer intends to promote an unapproved
use and fails to comply with the safe-harbor requirements, the FDA will bring, the agency declared, a
misbranding case.
Predictably, the issue once again found its way to Judge Lamberth’s court room. This time the WLF brought
a motion to conﬁrm and enforce district court’s earlier injunction.237 The foundation argued that the FDA’s
latest iteration of policy was exactly what the court had earlier prohibited and should be banned.238 Although
the Circuit Court had vacated parts of the injunction, WLF argued that a portion of the injunction “still
stands.”239
32The district court rejected this motion. Washington Legal Foundation had not claimed that the FDA’s
notice violated the First Amendment. It also did not argue that the agency’s notice contradicted its oﬃcial
interpretation of the FDAMA as announced during oral arguments before Circuit Court.240 Therefore, the
court concluded that the motion was premised on whatever force was left in its earlier injunction, and “quite
simply ...[there was] none.”241 The injunction was based entirely on constitutional law and the Court of
Appeals vacated the injunction “insofar as [it] declare[s] the FDAMA ...unconstitutional.”242 Accordingly,
the injunction had been “wholly vacated”243 and the FDA’s notice could not violate something that no
longer existed.
Thus, the legality of oﬀ-label regulation remains uncertain. While it seems clear that a manufacturer is
safe while operating within the FDAMA’s safe harbor, it is possible that promotional activities occurring
in waters beyond the harbor may be protected by the First Amendment as well. Indeed, Judge Lamberth
concluded his decision by acknowledging the unsatisfactory outcome of this case:
Today, the Court adds another order to this case’s voluminous ﬁle; yet the order will
do little to resolve the issues that lies at the heart of this dispute: whether the FDA
violates the First Amendment by penalizing g drug manufacturers for sending scientiﬁc
literature to physicians regarding oﬀ-label use. After six years’ worth of briefs, motions,
opinions, Congressional acts, and more opinions, the issue remains 100% unresolved, and
the country’s drug manufacturers are still without clear guidance as to their permissible
conduct. To say that the FDA’s ...Notice ﬁnally clariﬁes the situation is a farce; the
Notice speciﬁcally invites a constitutional challenge to each and every one of its enforcement
actions. That is no way to establish policy on an issue that both sides argue is of – quite
literally – life and death proportions244
B. The Western States Case
33The ultimate outcome in this policy debate remains unclear, and attempts to predict the future are almost
always foolhardy. Nevertheless, it should be noted that many scholars have turned to the Supreme Court’s
recent Western States245 decision for guidance. This case, which was decided after the Washington Legal
Foundation series, dealt with the constitutionality of a diﬀerent section of the FDAMA. Section 503A
regulates the practice of pharmacy compounding. This practice “involves a pharmacist making a variation
from an approved drug, based on a doctor’s prescription, to meet the individual needs of a patient.”246 For
example, a pharmacist might substitute an inactive ingredient if a patient is allergic to a component of the
standard mixture or might prepare a sweeter version of a particularly bitter drug for a young child.247 Any
change in a drug, however, “even in the inactive ingredients, can aﬀect its safety and eﬃcacy.”248
Compounding thus presents a similar regulatory challenge as oﬀ-label drugs. On one hand, there is consid-
erable value in this practice and Congress during the FDAMA debates was loathe to ban it outright. On
the other hand, the FDA expressed concern that unqualiﬁed approval could become a loophole in which
pharmacies could mass produce unapproved drugs and act as de facto manufacturers.249 Finally, industry
noted that pre-market approval of special compounds is not feasibly since it would be prohibitively costly
and time-consuming for the FDA to approve each variation of a drug.250
The legislation that emerged took a middle position. Section 503A restricts a pharmacists ability to advertise
its ability to compound a speciﬁc drug, but does not prohibit pharmacists ability to advertise this practice
generally.251 More speciﬁcally, the Act exempts compounded drugs from the FDA’s usual drug approval
requirements so long as the pharmacy complies with the advertising restrictions.252
34The compounding provisions of the FDAMA were challenged by a group of pharmacies specializing in
compounding drugs on First Amendment grounds, and the Supreme Court ruled that the restrictions violated
the Constitution’s guarantee of free speech.253 Since both parties agreed that the advertising restricted
by Section 503A was commercial speech, Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, concluded that the
provisions would be analyzed under the Central Hudson framework.254 Several commentators suggest that
the Court’s quick acceptance of the commercial speech framework reveals an emerging judicial consensus
that restrictions on pharmaceutical advertising will be evaluated as prohibitions on commercial rather than
scientiﬁc speech.255
Both parties agreed that the speech regulations did not satisfy the ﬁrst prong of the Central Hudson test.256
The advertisements at issue did not concern unlawful activity and could not be called misleading.257 Instead,
the dispute centered on the remaining three prongs: was there a substantial government interest, did the
regulations advance this interest, were the regulations no more extensive than necessary. On the ﬁrst
prong, the Court accepted the government’s assertion that it had a substantial interest in “preserving the
eﬀectiveness and integrity of the FDCA’s new drug approval process and the protection of the public health
that it provides.”258 This is signiﬁcant because the FDA made a similar argument during the WLF cases.259
The Court moved quickly passed the requirement that the regulation directly advance the government’s
interest, simply stating, “Assuming it is true that drugs cannot be marketed on a large scale without
advertising, the FDAMA’s prohibition on advertising compounded drugs might indeed ‘directly advance’
the government’s interest.”260 Indeed, this reasoning resembles Judge Lamberth’s ruling that one of the
few mechanisms available to the government for inﬂuencing a manufacturer’s behavior is to restrict its
marketing options.261 Instead, Justice O’Connor spent the most time on Central Hudson’s holding that the
government’s restrictions must be no more extensive than is necessary to serve its interests. She found, as
Judge Lamberth did in Washington Legal Foundation, that the government could achieve its objective using
less drastic means that prohibiting advertisements.262
In dicta that will likely guide future courts as they consider the constitutionality of restrictions on oﬀ-label
drug promotion, Justice O’Connor rejected the dissent’s argument that the FDAMA’s advertising ban was
motivated by a desire to protect patients who do not need a compounded (and possibly dangerous) drug but
might convince their doctors to prescribe them anyway.263 The government does not, she explained, have an
interest in “preventing the dissemination of truthful commercial information in order to prevent members
of the public from making bad decisions with the information.”264 The alternative to this “paternalistic
approach,” the court has long held, is to provide more information so that consumers can properly determine
their best interest.265 Once again analogizing to oﬀ-label drugs, supporters of increased regulation often
argue that oﬀ-label drug promotion presents unacceptable risk to the public.266 Western States appears to
foreclose this argument and support Judge Lamberth’s faith in full disclosure.
35Similarly, the majority rejected the argument that the government has an interest in banning the advertising
of compounded drugs because patients might misunderstand the risks assumed in taking the medicine. Since
the government did not contend that the advertisements were misleading, it could not logically argue that
patients might be deceived or given the wrong impression.267 Finally, Justice O’Connor noted that the
amount of beneﬁcial speech prohibited by Section 503A further supports the Court’s decision to hold the
new law unconstitutional.268 The advertising restrictions “would aﬀect pharmacists other than those inter-
ested in producing drugs on a large scale. It would prevent pharmacists with no interest in mass-producing
medications, but who serve clients with special needs [such as patients in a children’s hospital] from telling
doctors ...about ...alternative drugs available through compounding.”269 Likewise, prohibitions against
oﬀ-label drug advertising aﬀect not only those manufacturers who hope to manipulate the system,270 but
also those manufacturers who legitimately discover a new use for an existing product and wish to share this
information with physicians and their patients.
Western States and Washington Legal Foundation indicate that prohibitions against advertising oﬀ-label
uses have a high constitutional hurdle to clear. While certainly the speech protected in the FDAMA safe
harbor is protected, First Amendment rights to commercial speech may extend further. Future decisions
will have to clarify this ambiguity.
Interestingly, the one post WLF and Western States decision to address oﬀ-label promotion found the
FDAMA’s provisions to be constitutional. In February 2003, the government brought a nineteen-count
indictment against Ross Caputo and his business associates in United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois.271 The indictment charged the directors of the AbTox corporation with selling a
misbranded medical device272 when it promoted the oﬀ-label uses of its sterilizer.273 Like earlier cases,
Judge Ruben Castillo conducted a Central Hudson analysis and determined that speech did not concern an
unlawful activity and was not misleading.274 Moreover, noting that Western States identiﬁed maintaining
the eﬀectiveness and integrity of the new drug approval process as a substantial government interest, the
court held that there was such an interest and the speech prohibitions directly advanced the government’s
objective.275
36Yet in a departure from the holding of the D.C. District Court (and arguably the reasoning of the U.S.
Supreme Court) Judge Castillo ruled that the regulations satisﬁed the ﬁnal prong of the Central Hudson
test – they were not more broad than necessary to advance the government’s interest.276 Explaining his
reasoning in just one paragraph, Judge Castillo noted that the “Defendants’ First Amendment challenge
strikes at the every heart of the FDA’s ability to proscribe manufacturer promotion of oﬀ-label uses.” The
court was “unable to identify a less burdensome alternative that would advance the government’s substantial
interest.”277 Judge Lamberth’s disclosure alternative was not mentioned.
It remains to be seen whether this case is an anomaly or represents an alternative method of analysis for oﬀ-
label drugs. The diﬀerent result could perhaps be explained by the fact that Judge Castillo was considering a
small constitutional issue within the larger context of a criminal trial, while Judge Lamberth had the luxury
of pondering the legality of the FDAMA in a case brought to explore the reaches of the First Amendment.
Indeed, the Caputo case also dealt with mail fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy, and criminal violations of the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.278
Given the attention that the Washington Legal Foundation cases generated and the similar reasoning found
in Western States, a manufacturer willing to challenge the constitutionality of the FDAMA, would likely
ﬁnd itself in a favorable position. Judge Castillo’s decision will probably have little inﬂuence outside the
Northern District of Illinois.
V. The Neurontin Decisions
A. The False Claims Act
37The Neurontin controversy illustrates many of the principles discussed in the sections above. First unsealed
in 1999 but originally ﬁled in 1996, the case illustrates the latest attempt to regulate oﬀ-label drug use. The
case arose under the False Claim Act (FCA). This law, which Congress originally passed to combat Civil
War proﬁteering, has grown considerably in both scope and signiﬁcance in recent years. It provides that any
person who:
(1) knowingly presents or causes to be presented to an oﬃcer or employee of the
United States Government a false or a fraud claim for payment or approval; [or who]
(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get
a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government...
is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty ..., plus three times
the amount of damages which the government sustains because of the act of that per-
son.... 279
Although the legislative history focused on fraud committed by military contractors,280 the FCA has emerged
as the “federal government’s primary weapon to combat waste, fraud, and abuse”281
Much of the law’s success can be attributed to its unique enforcement mechanisms. A private party (referred
to as a relator) who learns of fraud against the government through non-public sources is authorized to act
a “de facto attorney general” and bring a legal action on the government’s behalf.282 These suits, which
are known as qui tam actions,283 oﬀer the relator strong incentives to identify and prosecute fraud; for each
violation of the False Claims Act, a successful relator will collect a large percentage of the civil penalty
and treble damages owed to the government.284 The qui tam provisions therefore “oﬀset inadequate law
enforcement resources and encouraged ‘a rogue to catch a rogue’ by inducing informers ‘to betray [their]
coconspirators.”’285 Indeed, the False Claims Act’s success in deterring fraud on the federal government
is well accepted and documented.286 Those who would defraud the government are forced to consider the
severe consequences of their actions and the real possibility of being caught.287
B. The Complaint
38The relator in the Neurontin case was David Franklin, a former “medical liaison” for Parke-Davis, a prescrip-
tion drug manufacturer. Franklin alleged he was part of an “elaborate and clandestine” eﬀort to promote
the oﬀ-label uses of Neurontin 288 The complaint, based on Franklin’s ﬁve months with the company,289
alleged that his former employer engaged in a campaign of false and misleading statements that led the
federal government to needlessly purchase Neurontin for Medicaid beneﬁciaries.
By way of background, Medicaid can generally only be used for “covered outpatient drugs.”290 This term
is deﬁned to exclude drugs “used for a medical indication which is not a medically accepted indication.”291
Medically accepted indications encompass uses which are approved under the Federal Food Drug and Cos-
metic Act or are listed in statutorily speciﬁed drug compendia.292 Thus, as the district court explained,
“unless a particular oﬀ-label use for a drug is included in one of the identiﬁed drug compendia, a prescription
for the oﬀ-label use of that drug is not eligible for reimbursement under Medicaid.”293 On behalf of the
United States government, Franklin, therefore, charged Parke-Davis with causing pharmacists, doctors, and
patients to request and receive reimbursement for uses of Neurontin not covered by the Medicaid program.294
39In 1994, the FDA approved Neurontin as an “adjunctive treatment” for epilepsy.295 As such, Neurontin
was not labeled for use by itself; instead, it was envisioned as an “add-on drug in the event that a primary
anti-epilepsy drug was not successful.”296 The medicine was approved for adults and in dosages of 900 to
1800mg/d.297 In his amended complaint, Franklin observed that while the market for the approved use of
Neurontin was limited, “the market for the others uses of Neurontin contemplated by Parke-Davis – pain
management, psychiatric disorders, anxiety, and depression – was huge.”298 Parke-Davis’ desire to enter this
broader market, the complaint argued, led it to illegally promote Neurontin’s many oﬀ-label uses.299
Franklin described a “publication strategy” in which Parke-Davis allegedly used and then surpassed the lim-
ited leeway it had to promote oﬀ-label uses of Neurontin.300 There were several reasons, Franklin explained,
to engage in this legally questionable campaign. First, Parke-Davis concluded that it would “be uneconomi-
cal to assume the expense and time necessary to conduct clinical trials to prove that Neurontin was safe and
eﬀective” for oﬀ-label uses.301 Indeed, even if the research were successful, and the oﬀ-label uses were shown
to be safe and eﬀective, Parke-Davis’ patent would soon expire and generic manufacturers would “reap much
of the reward of proving Neurontin could be safely used for other indications.”302 By promoting oﬀ-label
drugs surreptitiously, Parke-Davis expanded its product’s market without the expense usually associated
with such an endeavor. Moreover, Franklin noted, the publications strategy had an additional advance –
it could be launched immediately.303 There was “no need to wait for the results of scientiﬁcally conducted
clinical trials to determine if Neurontin was actually eﬀective in the treatment of these conditions.”304
Franklin identiﬁed several components of Parke-Davis’ strategy. First, the company sought to take advan-
tage of a pre-FDAMA regulation that permitted manufacturers to distribute publications describing oﬀ-label
uses of already approved drugs so long as the publications were produced by third parties.305 Parke-Davis
created “events and programs that would allow special Parke-Davis employees and independent contractors
under Parke-Davis’ control to promote oﬀ-label usage under circumstances that would allow the company
to plausibly deny that it had solicited oﬀ-label usage.”306 For example, the company allegedly “hired non-
physician technical writers to create articles for medical journals and the paid actual specialists to be the
articles’ authors.”307
This ghost writing scheme was elaborate. Parke-Davis allegedly had complete control over the content of
dozens of articles. It worked with hired technical writers to conceive the article idea, fabricate ideas, and
identify physicians who could lend their name and credibility to the report.308 In some cases, Franklin
claims, “drafts of the articles were completed ...before an author agreed to place his or her name on the
article.”309 This was even done when the article purported to discuss the author’s personal treatment of
actual payments.310 Physicians were paid $1000 to lend their name and were allowed to claim publication
credit on their curriculum vitae.311
An outside ﬁrm found journals willing to publish the articles so that Parke-Davis’ role could be hidden.312
While an article might reveal that the author “received an honorarium” from an outside ﬁrm, it never stated
that this honorarium was paid with money provided to the outside ﬁrm by Neurontin’s manufacturer or that
Parke-Davis had approved the content of the article.313 Once published, Parke-Davis allegedly presented
the articles “as evidence of independent research conducted by persons with no monetary interest in Neu-
rontin.”314 Since its usual marketing staﬀ was not allowed to discuss the drug’s oﬀ-label uses, Parke-Davis
hired medical liaisons, like Franklin, to “sell oﬀ-label and solicit interest in oﬀ-label uses.”315
40These medical liaisons were supposed to provide “balanced scientiﬁc information to doctors” but, in fact,
were charged with aggressively soliciting requests for oﬀ-label information from physicians.316 Liaisons
were allegedly trained to provide “non-scientiﬁc, anecdotal information designed to convince physicians that
oﬀ-label usage of Neurontin were safe and eﬀective.”317 In essence, the medical liaisons functioned as a
“surrogate sales force who had the liberty to solicit physicians regarding oﬀ-label uses.”318
Franklin further claimed that Parke-Davis knew that it was inappropriate to use medical liaisons in this
capacity. Before receiving his job oﬀer, the company asked Franklin whether he had diﬃcult working in gray
areas or bending rules, and during a training session, he was warned that “under no circumstances should
any information about oﬀ-label uses be put in writing.”319
To support his allegations, Franklin recorded conversations he had with Parke-Davis executives. For example,
in a May 1996 teleconference, John Ford, a marketing executive in the company’s New Jersey headquar-
ters instructed the medical liaisons that in order to remain proﬁtable, Neurontin had to be marketed for
monotherpay (it had only been approved as an adjunctive therapy), pain, bipolar disease and other psychi-
atric disorders.320 Each of these uses were oﬀ-label. In other conversation, “Ford was even blunter”:
I want you out there every day selling Neurontin....We all know Neurontin is not
growing [as an] adjunctive therapy, beside that is not where the money is. Pain man-
agement, now that’s money. Monotherapy, that’s money. We don’t want to share these
patients with everyone, we want them on Neurontin only. We want their who drug budget,
not a quarter, not half, the whole thing....We can’t wait for them to ask, we need to get out
there and tell them up front....That’s [why] we need to be holding their hand whispering
in their ear Neurontin for pain, Neurontin for monotherapy, Neurontin for everything....I
don’t want to see a single patient coming oﬀ Neurontin until they have been up to at least
4800mg/day. I don’t want to hear that safety crap either; have you tried Neurontin? Every
one of you should take one just to see there is nothing; it’s a great drug.321
41Tying these allegation in to the False Claims Act, Franklin observes that a “key aspect of this selling was
misrepresentation.” First, the status of the medical liaisons was misrepresented. Medical liaisons were
introduced as specialists in the speciﬁc use they were pressing at a particular meeting.322 Thus, medical
liaisons could be experts in anti-epileptic drugs during a morning session and an expert in cardiac medication
in the afternoon.323 “Sales personnel were instructed to introduce medical liaisons as scientiﬁc employees who
were given momentary leave of their academic duties to make an individual presentation to the physician; the
fact that the liaisons were part of the Parke-Davis’ standard marketing detail was intentionally hidden.”324
The information conveyed to the physicians was equally false. “Extensive misrepresentations” were made
regarding the scientiﬁc evidence for various oﬀ-label uses.325 Depending on the use promoted, medical
liaisons fabricated studies, exaggerated results, de-emphasized adverse eﬀects of the drug, exaggerated the
value of anecdotal evidence, and misrepresented Parke-Davis’ role in creating and sponsoring the distributed
publications.326
Concluding his allegations, Franklin observed that “one-quarter to one-third of all Neurontin prescriptions
in the United States were paid for by the Medicaid program.”327 Because oﬀ-label uses are not eligible
for reimbursement, he argued, “submission of a claim for reimbursement constitutes a false claim for the
purposes of [the False Claims Act.]”328 While, it is the pharmacist who physically submits the false claim, a
person who knowingly causes such a claim to be ﬁled is equally liable under the law.329 “Parke-Davis knew
that oﬀ-label prescriptions for Neurontin were ineligible for Medicaid reimbursement and that its activities
would, in fact, cause numerous ineligible prescriptions to be submitted to Medicaid.”330
42C. Two Decisions
While the case has not yet settled or reached a conclusion, Judge Patti Saris of the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts has ruled on Parke-Davis’ motion to dismiss331 and motion for
summary judgment.332 Both motions were denied.
In her decision denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Saris quickly rejected Parke-Davis’ argument that
Franklin did not plead with the speciﬁcity required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).333 A more
diﬃcult question was Parke-Davis’ contention that Franklin failed to state valid claim.
The pharmaceutical manufacturer argued that a relator “cannot use the FCA as an end-run around the
enforcement provisions of the FDCA by creating a cause of action for money damages.”334 In a ruling
signiﬁcant for not only the parties in this case but the pharmaceutical industry as a whole, the court rejected
this line of reasoning. While Judge Saris acknowledged that the FDCA does not provide the government
with a civil damage remedy to enforce the ban on oﬀ-label promotion ,335 she held that this omission does
not “preclude [an] FCA claim where the manufacturer has knowingly caused a false statement to be made
to get a false claim paid or approved by the government.”336 Furthermore, although there is not an FCA
cause of action each time a federal law or regulation is violated, the Act does create liability when “failure
to abide by a rule or regulation amounts to a material misrepresentation[] made to obtain a government be
beneﬁt.”337
43Parke-Davis next argued that the promotion of oﬀ-label uses does not constitute a false statement or fraud-
ulent conduct as required by the act.338 This contention was also rejected.339 While simply distributing
a scientiﬁc article might not rise to the level of an actionable oﬀense, Franklin alleged “more than a mere
technical violation” of the oﬀ-label regulations.340 “The gravamen of Relator’s claim is that Parke-Davis
engaged in an unlawful course of fraudulent conduct including knowingly making false statements to doctors
that caused them to submit claims that were not eligible for payment by the government under Medicaid.”341
Thus, the alleged FCA violations arose not from the unlawful marketing activity itself, but from the manu-
facturer’s attempt to cause others to defraud the government.342
Next Parke-Davis argued that the illegal actions of doctors and pharmacists were an “intervening force”
breaking the causal connection between its own actions and the fraud on the government.343 This idea was
summarily rejected as a matter of black letter law.344 Such an argument would only be sustained if the
intervening force was unforeseeable, and “participation of doctors and pharmacists in the submission of false
claims was not only foreseeable, it was an intended consequence of the alleged scheme of fraud.”345
Concluding her opinion,346 Judge Saris seemed to recognize the signiﬁcance of the case before her and to
signal her receptiveness to Franklin’s basic premise:
To be sure, Relator’s theory of liability takes the parties into territory that is not well-
charted by the existing decisional law. Nevertheless, the statutory language – which must
provide the touchstone for the Court’s analysis – supports Relator’s somewhat expansive
claim....Moreover, the terms of the FCA must be read liberally in accordance with their
remedial purpose.347
44In her order denying Parke-Davis’ motion for summary judgment Judge Saris discussed and elaborated
on similar themes. First, Parke-Davis argued that it could not be held liable because it did not make a
false statement.348 Under the company’s interpretation of the FCA, “an FCA plaintiﬀ must prove a false
statement that led to a false claim.”349 The court, however, rejected the idea that the FCA contains a
“double-falsehood requirement.”350 Examining the text of the statute,351 Judge Saris concluded that in
order for §§3729(a)(1) and (a)(2) to have diﬀerent meaning, as canons of statutory interpretation require,
only (a)(2) can be logically read as containing a double-falsehood requirement.352 While §3729(a)(2) imposes
liability on any person who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used a false record or statement
to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the government” §3729(a)(1) merely creates liability
when a defendant “knowingly presents, or causes, to be presented ...a false or fraudulent claim.”353 Since
Franklin did not limit his claims to §3729(a)(2) he did not need to prove that Parke-Davis lied to physicians
about Neurontin’s oﬀ-label eﬃcacy or safety.354 There is suﬃcient evidence to hold a manufacturer liable
if it is proven that the company simply induced physicians or pharmacists to ﬁle false claims with truthful
statements.355
45Note that this section of the opinion clariﬁed an ambiguous passage of the court’s earlier opinion and
underscored the inﬂuence this case may have on industry practice. In her earlier decision, Judge Saris noted
in dicta that “A much closer question would be presented if the allegations involved only the unlawful –
yet truthful – promotion of oﬀ-label uses to physicians who provide services to patients who are covered by
Medicaid without any fraudulent representation by the manufacturer.”356 In dismissing Parke-Davis’ motion
for summary judgment, however, Judge Saris wrote: “With the beneﬁt of a more fulsome factual record, it
is now apparent that the ‘much closer question’ can no longer be ducked. Under §3729(a)(1), the only issue
is whether Parke-Davis ‘caused to be presented’ a false claim, and §3729 does not require that the ‘cause’
be fraudulent or otherwise independently unlawful.”357 This ruling is signiﬁcant. A manufacturer need not
lie or deceive in order to incur liability. Simply encouraging physicians or pharmacists to recommend drugs
in an oﬀ-label manner could make a drug company susceptible to a False Claims cause of action.
46In its motion for summary judgment, Parke-Davis withdrew its earlier statement that the company “does
not dispute than an oﬀ-label prescription submitted for reimbursement by Medicaid is a false claim within
the meaning of the FCA.”358 As discussed above, the Medicaid program will only pay for “covered outpa-
tient drugs” and this term excludes drugs prescribed for oﬀ-label purposes.359 Parke-Davis argued, however,
that “forty-two states permit reimbursement for oﬀ-label, non-compendium drug prescriptions....[T]herefore
claims for Medicaid reimbursement for oﬀ-label Neurontin prescriptions in those states were not false
claims.”360 In support of this conclusion, the company cited 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d)(1)(B) which it con-
tends allows states to decide for themselves whether they wish to cover oﬀ-label drugs.361 This statutes
states that “a state may exclude or otherwise restrict coverage of a covered outpatient drug if – (i) the
prescribed use is not for a medically accepted indication.”362 Since this provision uses the word “may,” the
company argued, states need not and most do not exclude coverage. Franklin, however, disputed Parke-
Davis’ conclusion that 42 states will reimburse for Neurontin.363 Moreover, he argued that §1396r-8 only
encompasses “covered outpatient drugs” and, as noted earlier, this phrase excludes oﬀ-label uses.364
While acknowledging that Franklin’s interpretation of §1396r-8 rendered it superﬂuous and thus less de-
sirable, Judge Saris ultimately concluded that “it is not clear which side gets the better of the statutory-
tail-chases-cat debate” and reserved judgment until the government submits an amicus brief stating its
“understanding of the extent to which the Medicaid statute empowers states to provide coverage of oﬀ-label,
non-compendium prescriptions.”365 The court was able to avoid the issue because Parke-Davis had acknowl-
edged that eight states do not oﬀer reimbursement for oﬀ-label prescriptions and in those states submitting
a request for payment constitutes a false claim.366 Thus, “at best Parke-Davis’ argument goes to the amount
of damages and does not provide a basis for summary judgment of liability under the FCA.”367
D. Implications
47The signiﬁcance of this case has not gone unnoticed. In an October 2003 speech, Assistant U.S. Attorney
Virginia Gibson commented that prosecutors across the country are monitoring the case and have found the
opinion “instructive.”368 She further noted that the opinion sanctions lawsuits against manufacturers who
use “truthful” oﬀ-label promotion but nevertheless violate the law.369 Gibson outlined the types of evidence
the Department of Justice would consider when determining whether to prosecute a manufacturer for oﬀ-
label promotion.370 For example, “we would look at a situation where ...there was a very small market for
the approved use ...but there was a very large sales force. That would prompt us to look further.”371 Other
factors that would attract attention from DOJ oﬃcials included “ﬁnancial incentives for oﬀ-label use only;
failure to identify the company’s funding for research for articles that it presents ...[and] health consequences
from oﬀ-label uses that are not disclosed.”372 Finally, Ms. Gibson aﬃrmed that prosecutors will “look at the
role of the manufacturer in the prescribing activity at all levels – whether there were inducements, whether
there were false statements.”373 Indeed, the Boston U.S. attorney’s oﬃce has ﬁled a statement of interest
with the court and is negotiating a settlement with Parke-Davis.374
At the same conference, Paul Kalb, a Washington DC attorney told participants that he believes FCA
cases involving oﬀ-label promotion will increase.375 Since the FCA, unlike the FDCA, creates a private
right of action, there will be countless potential whistleblowers available to bring suit.376 Indeed, other
attorneys have reached similar conclusions: “This is going to be the seminal case for oﬀ-label False Claims
Act litigation” a former Justice Department lawyer commented.377 “The Neurontin case is a wake-up call
to the manufacturer community to take a hard look at how their compliance and training is set up.”378
VI. Conclusion
48Promotion of oﬀ-label drugs presents a policy conundrum for the courts, the FDA, and Congress. As with
most regulation of the prescription drug industry, policy makers must walk a ﬁne line between protecting
the public’s interest in safe and eﬀective medicine and allowing the sick access to the medicine they need.
This balancing is only more diﬃcult in the area of oﬀ-label promotion. The drug has been approved by the
FDA; it is on the market; doctors are free to prescribe it; and there is usually some evidence that the new
use is safe and eﬀective. Nevertheless, for very legitimate reasons, the FDA restricts manufacturers’ ability
inform physicians and the public of their products’ oﬀ-label capabilities.
The FDA is no doubt correct that the pharmaceutical industry needs a reason to seek the government’s
endorsement of newly discovered uses. The approval process is long, cumbersome, and expensive, and man-
ufacturers are operating in the shadow of their product’s looming patent expiration. Few would voluntarily
endure this process if they were not rewarded with the ability to promote their product to a new set of
patients. Yet, the Agency’s regulations seem to clash with First Amendment values for the government is
restricting the distribution of information. If a product is sold legally, and if manufacturers are not lying or
deceiving, why should there be limitations on communicating with physicians? It is perhaps this collision of
values that has kept the legal status of oﬀ-label drugs nebulous. Indeed, the FDA, the courts, and Congress
seem unable to decide whether to frown upon or approve of oﬀ-label promotion and many questions remain.
The constitutionality of regulations restricting oﬀ-label promotion has not been decided deﬁnitively. While
Congress, no doubt, has created a safe harbor for manufacturers, are activities outside this small area also
protected by the Constitution? If a manufacturer distributed a sales brochure rather than a scientiﬁc article,
it would surely violate the FDAMA, but perhaps this activity is protected by the First Amendment.
The Neurontin lawsuit only exacerbates an already complicated area of the law. If Franklin is successful,
private whistleblowers will be able to trump whatever balance Congress created in the FDCA and FDAMA.
Manufacturers who wish to promote oﬀ-label uses of their products will either have to risk a false claims
lawsuit or simply stop promoting oﬀ-label drugs altogether. Surely this is not a desirable outcome. It is not
economically feasible to seek approval for all uses of drugs, and physicians need more information to treat
their patients, not less.
Drugs used for cancer treatment illustrates this point. As discussed above,379 most oncologists rely on oﬀ-
label drugs to treat their patients. Often the oﬀ-label drug oﬀers the only hope of saving a life. Few could
argue that in these circumstances physicians should be denied this crucial information, and as Senator Frist
noted it is physically impossible for a doctor to read even a small portion of the medical literature produced
each year. Thus, as Paul Kalb has argued, “if drugs are being used even for an unapproved use to potentially
held save someone ...then it is very hard for me to understand the public policy behind a prosecution in
that area.”380
49Perhaps Neurontin is a bad case from which to evaluate the debate over oﬀ-label promotion. At least in
the early stages of the lawsuit, it appears that Parke-Davis went well past what it legally can do (as well as
what it morally should do) in order to sell its product. There is no reason to believe that other companies
would act as aggressively if restrictions on oﬀ-label promotion were relaxed.
On the other hand, perhaps this case illustrates precisely why FDA regulation is needed. Companies respond
to natural pressures from the marketplace by trying to sell more goods. Indeed, in most industries, increased
sales is a sure sign of success. Perhaps, therefore, the pharmaceutical industry – and the public – needs
government regulation to check a manufacturers ability to promote a product that it believes is life-saving
but may be deadly.
Commentators have struggled with these problems and have arrived at a variety of conclusions. Some argue
that we ought to simplify the approval process so that it will be less burdensome to manufacturers.381 Others
have suggested that tort law or anti-trust law will protect patients and the government need not speciﬁcally
regulate oﬀ-label promotion.382 While it is true that these areas of the law oﬀer an important avenue of
compensation and restrict truly outrageous behavior, these commentators ignore what seems to be the lesson
of the Neurontin and Washington Legal Foundation lawsuits – there should be a comprehensive policy of
oﬀ-label promotion that balances society’s multitude of interests.
This balancing is a task for Congress and not private litigants. While I do not dispute the need for compen-
sation when injuries occur, only a legislative body can weigh the many competing interests. Although it is
no doubt diﬃcult, and it will surely be impossible to please all parties, Congress ought to develop a compre-
hensive policy that balances the right to communicate and the need for information with legitimate concerns
about patient safety. This policy should not be set by qui tam lawsuits, tort cases, or even constitutional
challenges. Rather, it should be created by the government itself.
50